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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
OLOF NELSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, VINCENT- PETERS 0 N CONSTRUCTION C 0 MPANY, GRONE1fAN & COMPANY, YOUNG & SMITH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, UTAH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Petitioners & Appellants
vs.

Case No. 7633

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and THE BOARD OF
REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE and
CLAIMS SUPERVISOR of its DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, and JOSEPH B. ALLMAN ET AL,
Respondents & Appellees

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
On June 27, 1950, a representative of the Utah Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission
of Utah, issued a determination that Joseph B. Allman and
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others were not disqualified for unemployment compensation
benefits by reason of Section 42-2a-5 (d) of the Utah Act. The
representative found that the claimants' unemployment was
not due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a
strike involving his grade, class, or group at the establishment
at which he was last employed.
On July 5, 1950, by counsel, the employers of the claimants involved filed an appeal. The matter was referred directly
to the Appeals Referee who conducted a hearing on August
3, 1950. On the 22nd day of August, 1950, the Referee affirmed the decision of the representative, and on the 28th day
of August, the employers appealed to the Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission. At the request of the parties
the decision of the Board of Review was delayed until the
18th day of December, 1950. At that time the Board of Review
affirmed the decision of the representative and the Referee,
and the mtater is now before this court on Petition for Writ
of Review.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The individual claimants involved filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits for the calendar week which
ended June 10, 1950.
The Labor Committee of the Associated General Con·
tractors was authorized to negotiate on behalf of the members
of the Associated General Contractors regarding the wage
clause of the contract (currently in effect between the members
and the 6 basic crafts, which were: The International Hod Car·
4
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riers, Building and Common Laborers Union; the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; the International Union of Operating Engineers; the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America;.· the Operative Plasterers and Cement
Finishers Association; and the International Association of
Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, all affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and representing
the local unions of the state) . The wage clause of the contract was opened effective March 1, 1950, by 90 day notice
submitted by the authorized representatives of the unions under
the date of February 27, 1950.
The negotiations between the Labor· Committee of · the
Associated General Contractors and the representatives of the
6 basic crafts were not successful, and on the morning of June
2, 1950, the union, pursuant to a strike vote duly taken, instituted strikes (and picket lines) against two jobs; one job was
that of Earl S. Paul, an A. G. C. member, and the other was
that of Ellis W. Barker, an A. G. C. member. On the afternoon of June 2, the Utah Construction Company, an A. G. C.
member, shut down its operations. The balance of the A. G. C.
members shut down their operations on or about June 5, 1950.
The shut downs which followed the strike of June 2 were in
accordance with a previous agreement between the members
of the A. G. C. The unions had been notified on several occasions that the Associated General Contractors considered that
a strike against one of the members during a negotiating period
would be considered as a strike against all of the members.
(Tr. 23).
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The Associated General Contractors, under its organizational authority, was authorized to negotiate on behalf of all
of the members. Any negotiated agreement became binding on
the members when signed by the members themselves or by
individuals vested with the power of attorney for those members (Tr. 27, 31).
Any agreement negotiated by the representatives of the
6 basic crafts would become binding on the crafts only when
ratified by the locals through their designated representatives.
None of the claimants involved in this matter were employed
by the two employers whose jobs were struck; they were employees of A. G. C. members who shut down their operations
pursuant to the pre-arranged understanding. The facts show
that the workers on all but the two struck jobs reported for
work on the morning of June 2 and thereafter until their respective employer shut down his operation (Tr. 41).
Prior to and after the strike on June 2 the unions or their
representatives had made no demands on Ellis W. Barker or
Earl S. Paul,· the two employer members involved. There was
no strike called at the other jobs which Ellis W. Barker or
Earl S. Paul had in progress at the time (Tr. 50).

THE ISSUE
The issue involved in this matter is that of whether or
not the claimants should be disqualified from receiving unem·
ployment compensation benefits pursuant to the provisions of
Section 42-2a- 5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1943 (Utah Em·
ployment Security Act) .
6
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ARGUMENT
THE CLAI!\-1ANTS WERE NOT UNEMPLOYED DUE
TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE
OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THEIR GRADE, CLASS, OR
GROUP OF WORKER AT THE FACTORY OR ESTABLISHMENT AT WHICH THEY WERE LAST EMPLOYED.
The Utah Employment Security Act provides in part,
Secti~n 42-2a-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1943, that:
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for
purposes of establishing a waiting period:
" (d) For any week in which it is found by the Commission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work which exists because of a strike involving his
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at which he is or was last employed."

If the claimants are to be disqualified under this provision
of the Act, it is necessary to adopt the theory that because the
representatives of the six basic crafts were negotiating for the
six crafts, no "pressure" action could be taken by the unions
short of affecting the entire membership of the Associated
General Contractors. Actually, of course, the unions took strike
votes and struck only two jobs of A. G. C. members. All other
workmen reported for work on the other jobs and continued
to work until their respective employers shut the jobs down
pursuant to· the agreement between the membership of the
Associated General Contractors.
From the record (Tr. 41) we think it may be assumed
that the workmen on the jobs which were not struck would
7
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have continued to report for work and would have continued
working had the respective employers not closed their jobs.
There is little doubt but what the objective on the part of
the union by striking the two jobs was to apply an economic
pressure which would assist the bargaining representatives of
the six basic crafts in arriving at a satisfactory settlement with
the members of the A. G. C. The employer members of the
A. G. C. had, through the Association, announced that they
would consider a strike against one to be a strike against all
of the membership. Consequently, when the two jobs were
struck the employers, pursuant to their agreed strategy, applied economic pressure against the unions by closing down
all construction operations of the members. Some of these
operations were closed on the afternoon of June 2, the day
of the strike, and the others were closed down on or before
the afternoon of June 5.
The respondents contend that the facts make it clear that
there was no strike at any of the operations other than the two
at which pickets were established, and that since there was no
strike at these other establishments, the claimants were not
ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
The petitioners discuss at some length the laws of other
jurisdictions which use instead of the word "strike" the term
"labor dispute." There is no doubt but that a labor dispute
existed in the construction industry between the A. G. C. members and the six basic crafts. It must be borne in mind, however, that the term "labor dispute" is much broader in its
application than is the term "strike," which is contained in the
Utah Act.
8
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If claimants are otherwise eligible they will not be considered ineligible under the Utah Act unless they are involved
in a strike at the establishment at which they were last em·
ployed. The term establishment cannot be interpreted as to
include the entire operations of all of the A. G. C. members.
It must be limited as including the operations of the employer
by whom the worker was employed. In this case it was stipulated (Tr. 13) "That the individual employing unit is the
respective employer of the individual claimant involved and
that the individual claimant is represented by his respective
craft union for the purpose of collective bargaining."
The Utah Employment Security Act was patterned after
an act proposed by the Social Security Board, which act was
patterned after the British National Insurance Act. Under the
British acts disqualification is based upon a work stoppage due
to a trade dispute (Utah limits the disqualification to strikes)
at the factory, work shop, or other premises at which the claimant is employed. The British Umpire, which is the final arbiter
under the British Act, has consistently held that the words
"factory, work shop, or other premises" refer to single units
of employment. In adapting the language for use in Utah, the
word "establishment" was substituted for "work shop." It
would not appear that this change was intended to broaden
the scope of the employment area so as to encompass a whole
industry rather than a single unit of employment.
We submit that there was no strike at the respective
establishments at which the claimants were employed and that
the ultimate and final act which caused their unemployment
was not the strike and the establishing of pickets at the Paul and
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Barker jobs, but was the action of the other members in closing
down their operations.
An examination of the cases involving a similar situation
reveals none involving the exact language which is included
in the Utah Act. However, we would like to summarize the
cases ~hich do involve substantially the same factual situation.
In the matter of Steve C. Bucko, ·Respondent vs. J. F.
Quest Foundry Company, Relator (Minnesota Supreme Court),
reported at 38 N. W. 2d 22:., which dealt with unemployment
compensation, a similar situation existed. Twelve foundry
operators whose employees were members of the International
Moulders and Foundry Workers Union of North America, associated themselves together for the purpose of more effective
bargaining with the union. The association in that case appears
to have been more loosely formed than is the Association of
General Contractors. Any member of that association could
withdraw during negotiations simply by notifying the other
members that it wished to withdraw. In that case the union
served notice on the employers through their bargaining agent
that it desired to negotiate changes in the contract then in
force. Two days later the employers through the association
notified the union that they in turn desired to negotiate changes
in the contract. After some fruitless negotiations between the
association and the union, a vote was taken by the union among
all its members present at a particular meeting, which vote
resulted in a general authorization being granted to the strike
committee to call a strike at any of the foundry plants involved.
Employees of each of the twelve foundries participated in this
vote.
10
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The union duly filed a notice to strike, and the negotiations
continued for a while. The union was then advised by the
association that the members of the association would consider
a strike against any one of its twelve members to be a strike
against all of its members. The twelve employers, through
their association, notified the labor conciliator as follows:
"As the representative of the foundry employers
listed below, I am herewith, at their instruction, filing
with you a notice under the .i\1innesota Labor Relations
Act of their intention to institute a lockout in connection with a current labor dispute.
"This lockout notice is only for the purpose of protecting this employer group against an attempt on the
part uf the union to strike less than all of the twelve
companies negotiating as a unit with the union. It will
be used only if the union strikes less than all twelve
companies in the event any strike should take place as
a result of the existing dispute.''
On April 14 the strike committee called a strike against
two of the twelve employers, and two days later struck against
a third employer. On April 22 the remaining nine employers
notified their workers that there would be no further work
until the dispute was settled, and on April 26 these nine foundries shut down.
The court found that the employees of the mne plants
against which no strike had been called were willing to continue
working at the time the nine plants were closed. The Minnesota Act provides:
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(d) For any week with respect to which the Com11
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mission finds that his total or partial unemployment
is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a
labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other
premises at which he is or was last employed; provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown
to the satisfaction of the Commission that ( 1) he is
not participating in or financing a labor dispute which
caused the stoppage of work; and (2) that he does
not belong to the grade, group or class of workers of
which immediately before the commencement of the
stoppage there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing the dispute ... "
In addition the Minnesota Act provided that benefits
would not be denied to an employee who becomes unemployed
because of a lockout or by dismissal during the period of negotiation of any labor dispute and prior to the commencement
of a strike.
The court m discussing the eligibility of the claimants
who were employees of the nine employers stated:
·'When a lockout is instituted, the employee does
not sever his relationship with his employer, but the
employee is out of work due to an act of the employer
over which he has no control.
"It can hardly be said that respondent and the others
similarly situated were out of work due to a strike
against the three establishments in which they were
not employed. It is no doubt true that had it not been
for the exception pertaining to a lockout, it could be
said that a labor dispute existed at the other nine places
as well, but in view of the fact that there was no strike
called against the nine employers here involved and
a lockout is excepted from the disqualifying labor dis12
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pute, the term 'strike' cannot be extended to encompass
those nine employers whose employees were willing
to continue working under the terms of the former
contract.
"In the second place, the employers, themselves, have
recognized the fact that the employees of the nine establishments were unemployed as a result of the lockout.
They served their notice of intention to lockout required
by our State Labor Relations Act."
In the instant case, the members of the Associated General Contractors, through the Association Labor Committee, notified the six basic crafts that a strike against one would be
deemed to be a strike against all. The employers did not
specifically state what action they would take in case less than
all of the members were struck.
The Minnesota court continued:
"Here the employees of the nine establishments involved were willing to continue working under the old
contract. Relator seeks to convert the lockout into a
strike. It argues that the labor dispute produced the
strike; that the lockout was not the result of the labor
dispute, but, instead, the result of the strike. That being true, it argues that there was no lockout within the
meaning of the term as used in the Employment and
Security Law.
"The weakness of this argument is that the Relator
assumes that the association of twelve employers was
a bargaining unit and that the strike against three
members forced the employers at the other nine establishments to discontinue operation. There is no evidence that would sustain such a finding. The fact that
a strike was called against three did not. compel the
other nine to close their shops. They did so in order
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to make use of an economic weapon which they held
in their hands and for the sole purpose of forcing the
union to accept terms less favorable than those which
the union demanded. The evidence is conclusive that
at the time the nine establishments closed their doors,
the employees of those nine were willing to continue
to work at the existing rates of pay and according to
terms of the pre-existing contract. As such it cannot
be said that the unemployment was due to a strike.
To be sure, there was a labor dispute existing in all
twelve establishments, but the Legislature has seen
fit to remove from the disqualification unemployment
due to a lockout, and it cannot be said that unemployment in the nine establishments was due to anything
but the lockout.''
This court's attention is again called to the fact that the
disqualification provision in the Utah Act is much more limited
in its scope by the use of the word "strike" than it would be
had the words "labor dispute" been used as a basis for the disqualification. With this difference in mind, it would appear
that what the Minnesota court said with reference to the underlying reason for the unemployment would apply equally well
in the instant case. While there was no determination in the
instant case that a lockout existed, the actual shutdown of op·
erations by those employers who were not "struck" must be
construed as having the same force and effect.
In. the case of Rhea Manufacturing Company vs. Indus·
trial Commission, 231 Wis. 643, 651, 285 N. W. 749, the court
said, in discussing the aspects of the lockout:
"Viewed in its social and economic aspects, the lockout is a weapon in the hands of the employers which
is a counterpart to the weapon of strike held by the
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workers. . . . Like the use of any other weapon, the
consequences to the one against whom it is directed,
as well as to the one who directs its use, must be weighed before it is used, and if its use results in more harm
to the holder of the weapon than to the one against
\Yhom it is directed, he who has control of its use should
not be heard to complain that it has resulted in harm
to himself."
In the case of McKinley, et al, vs. California Employment
Stabilization Commission, 209 P. 2d 602, which case dealt
with unemployment compensation claims, the facts were as
follows: (This case was cited briefly by the petitioners in this
matter, and we think it merits a somewhat exhaustive discussion).
The Sacramento Wholesale Bakers Association, comprising all of the Sacramento "machine shop baking industry," was
organized in 1935 for the purpose of representing its members
in labor relations. Prior to the formation of the association,
either individually or jointly, the employers had entered into
contracts with the Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Union of America, Local 85. Since 1935 a master
contract upon an industry-wide basis was negotiated, and on
behalf of the employers, executed by the executive secretary
of the association. (It will be remembered that in the instant
case the members either signed the master contract individually
or through an individual given written power of attorney to
sign).
While the collective bargaining agreement in force in Cali~
fornia contained no such provision, the members of the association understood among themselves that they would act as
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a unit in collective bargaining matters and that a strike against
any one or more members would be treated by them as a strike
against all. As in the instant case, the union members were
well aware of this declaration.
Early in 1947, and prior to the expiration date of the master contract, the union advised the executive secretary of the
association that it desired to amend the contract generally as
to wages, hours, and working conditions: During the negotiations which followed, the members of the union employed
at the petitioners' plants authorized the negotiating committee
in its discretion to call a strike against any one or more of the
employers. When negotiations broke down, the union declared
a strike against the Butter Cream Baking Company, one of
the members of the association. Within the next few days the
other employer members of the association closed their plants.
The employees in these bakeries continued to work until these
plants were closed. As in our case, the union did not, prior to
the strike against the one association member, make any demands upon the individual employers. After the bakeries ceased
operations, the picket line included employees from bakeries
other than the struck plant. (This fact differs from the instant case, in which there was no participation by the other
employees in the picketing) .
The California Act provides, Section 56:
"An individual is not eligible for benefits for unemployment, and no such benefits shall be payable to
him under any of the following conditions:
" (A) If he left his work because of a trade dispute
and for the period during which he continues out of
16
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work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is
still in active progress in the establishment in which he
was employed."
Again, it must be borne in mind that the Utah disqualification applies only where the individual claimant's unemployment is a direct result of a strike involving his grade, group,
or class at the establishment at which he is employed.
There is no doubt but that there was a labor dispute in the
instant case as there was in the California case. It must be
noted that the decision in the California case turns upon the
fact that the court found that the claimants in the plants which
were not struck did in effect suffer unemployment by reason
of their own voluntary acts. The employers contend that it is
the union action of striking the Butter Cream Plant which
caused the shutdown. The respondents argued that the employees were willing to work in the petitioners' plants and
did so until they were locked out. The court held that the employees of the Sacramento bakeries left their work voluntarily
and therefore should be .excluded from receiving unemployment
benefits. The court stated:
"The selection of a certain plant or plants for a shutdown by strike at a particular time was a mere matter
of strategy in the conduct of the trade dispute which
equally involved all of the bakeries and their employees. This in effect applied the union's economic
sanctions against each employer and brought about the
unemployment of all of its members. Had the association acted first by dosing down one of the member
plants and the union followed with a strike against
all of the remaining plants, it would be equally clear

17
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that the volitional act causing unemployment was the
initial shutdown.
"Either the union or the individual employer at any
time could have broken off joint negotiations and bargained with its employees on an individual basis, but
that course was not taken. At no time did the union
purport to be directing any action solely against the
Butter Cream Plant; instead, the union continued
throughout to deal directly with the association for the
purpose of obtaining a new master contract. To say,
therefore, that the act of striking the one plant did not
shut down work in the other plants of the association
which were subject to the labor negotiations for the
purpose of obtaining a master contract, is wholly unrealistic. Industry-wide negotiations had been established by these employers and consistently carried on
for over 10 years."
The court stated:
"The volitional test established in Bodinson Manufacturing Company vs. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, was based upon the principle
that innocent victims of a trade dispute should not
suffer loss of their unemployment insurance rights.
But the unemployment of the bakery workers was
caused by their own action taken with full knowledge
of its consequences. In the Waffle Shop case, the
unemployment was due to a lockout; here the lockout
of the bakeries was due to a strike."
In the Bunny's .Waffle Shop vs. California Employment
Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735, certain restaurant owners sought
to compel their employees, through their union, to deal with
a newly organized San Francisco Employers' Council in obtaining a collective bargaining agreement. The union refused
18
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to bargain except with the individual employers as had been
the custom. To compel the joint negotiations, the restaurant
owners made a reduction of 25 per cent in wages, and a 6-day
week with split shifts was established instead of the existing
5-day week and the straight shift. When the employees were
paid at the lower rate, they left their jobs. Subsequently, the
restaurants were closed down. Later, the employers presented
the question as to whether or not the employees should be disqualified from receivirrg benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act because they had left their work.
The court held that the claimants left their work because
of the economic weapon used by the employers (that of reducing wages and changing shifts) and not because of the
trade dispute which was then in existence. The court concluded
that in reality the form of cessation of employment is not controlling and that the determinative factor is the volitional
cause of the work stoppage. The court held t4at although the
employees left work of their own choice, that choice was not
freely made but was compelled by the economic weapon which
the employers used. The California court's decision in the
McKinley case, therefore, was influenced by its previous decision in the Bunny's Waffle Shop case.
Three justices dissented from the opinion in the McKinley
case, supra. Justice Gibson in his dissent says:
"It is conceded that the right to benefits depends
upon whether the worker left his job of his own free
will or was forced to do so because of the acts of others
and that under the Bodinson case, Section 56 disqualifies
only those workers who voluntarily leave their work
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. . . Thus, although the section clearly precludes the
payment of benefits to employees who go out on strike
... , it has been treated as more generally disqualifying
workers who were locked out by their employers. (See
Bunny's Waffle Shop vs. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735; Bodinson Manufacturing Company vs. California Employment Commission, supra,
at p. 327). It would be a contradiction in terms to
hold that a locked out employee had voluntarily left
his work.
"The majority opinion, however, concludes that the
employees 'left their work vofuntarily and therefore
should have been excluded from receiving unemployment benefits.' The theory seems to be that because
the union and the employers' association were negotiating with regard to proposed changes in the master
contract and because the union had been informed of
an understanding or agreement solely among the employers that a strike against one of them would be
treated as a strike against all, the members of the
union by permitting a strike against one employer,
thereby 'placed themselves outside the class of persons
who are properly protected by the subjective volitional
exception to Section 56 which wa~ ~tated ~nd applie~
in the Bodinson case.' In my optruon, thts theory IS
unsound and does not warrant the conclusion that petitioners' employees voluntarily left their work."
Gibson points out that in the Bunny's case the court actually held that the employees left work because of the economic
weapon (the act of the employers in reducing wages and changing shifts) and not because of the trade dispute then in existence. He points out:
·'The opinion in the Bunny's case indicates that t?e
court really treated the employees as hav1ng voluntanly
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left .work. At pp. 742-743 of 24 Cal. 2d, the court
found it necessary to determine whether tif they left
their work voluntarily they are subject to the temporary
disqualification imposed by Section 58 (A) of the ~ct
upon one who left his most recent work voluntardy
without good cause ... ' and it was held that there was
'good cause' within the meaning of Section 58 (A) .
(Italics added.) It is obvious that Section 58 (A)
would not have required any discussion at all if, as
the majority opinion now states, the ruling with respect
to Section 56 had been based upon the theory that the
leaving was not voluntary."
He continues:
"These employers were in no way compelled or
forced to lock their doors to protect their plants or
jobs, and the purpose of the lockout was simply to give
them an added advantage in bargaining with the union.
The strike was directed only against the Butter Cream
Baking Company, and the petitioners were not subjected to strike or threat to strike or any other activity
which would have forced them to close down. The
most that can be claimed is that petitioners were subjected to indirect pressure resulting from a strike against
a different employer at a different establishment, which
might place them at some disadvantage in negotiations."
As Gibson points out, the California law is unique since
the labor dispute disqualification found in Section 56, based
solely on the voluntary leaving of work, does not appear in
the unemployment insurance acts of any other jurisdiction today.
Justice Carter also dissented.

He said:

"Neither do I believe that anything said in Bodinson
Manufacturing Company vs. California Employment
Commission, 1 7 Cal. 2d 321, or in Bunny's Waffle Shop
vs. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735,
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requires such an interpretation of the Unemployment
Insurance Act. It strikes me that the interpretation
placed on this act by the majority in this case is just
a step toward the ultimate holding that an overall employers' association which unites industry of the community or state for the purpose of dealing with labor
problems could make it impossible for any employee who belongs to a union to obtain unemployment
insurance benefits by closing all industry in the event
of a strike against any member of the group comprising the overall employer organization. In other words,
in order for an organizational employer group to exert
economic pressure to prevent a strike against one of
their group, a complete shutdown or lockout could
be inaugurated with the result that none of the employees locked out, and thereby involuntarily unemployed, could receive unemployment compensation
benefits."
It appears to us, the respondents in the instant case, that
actually the decision in the Bunny's Waffle case to allow benefits to the claimants involved was based simply on the proposition that the individual claimants voluntarily quit their work
because of the economic move of the employers to reduce wages
and change shifts and that they had good cause for quitting.
The majority opinion in the McKinley case appears to misinterpret the holding in the Bunny's Waffle case and to go a long
way in order to uphold what the majority thought was its
decision in the Bunny's Waffle case.

In the McKinley case, as in the instant case, the proximate
cause of the unemployment of the claimants who were not
directly involved in the strike was the shutting down of operations by the balance of the employers. It is merely a case of
the unions using one economic weapon to strike, and the em-
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ployers retaliating with another economic weapon-that of
shutting down operations. It further appears to the respondents that unless the petitioners can establish that the several
jobs of the various members of the Association constitute one
establishment, the petitioners must fail in their arguments.
Again, we adn1it that there was a labor dispute existing
between the unions and the several employers. That fact,
however, is immaterial since strike is much narrower in scope
than labor dispute.
In the case of Morand Brothers Beverage Company, et al,
Distillery, Rectifying and Wine Workers International Union
of America (AFL), 91 NLRB 58, Case No. 13-CA-250, September 25, 1950, CCH 10, 314, Labor Law Reporter, Vol. II,
the facts and ruling were as follows:
Bargaining between 35 Chicago wholesale liquor distributors and the union representing the salesmen of the distributors had been conducted on an association-wide basis since
1943. When negotiations for a new contract reached a stalemate, the union struck Old Rose Distributing Company but
did not strike the remaining employer members of the association. On the following day each of the 35 employer members
sent a letter to its respective salesmen asking them to "turn
over to us immediately any records, papers, credentials, or
monies that you have belonging to us and come and see us immediately so that we may settle the financial differences that
exist to date between us." Upon receipt of this letter, some
salesmen considered it a notice of discharge, while others reported to work and were told that they were no longer employed or that thetr employment had ceased.
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The Board held that the act did not permit a discharge
to reduce, by anticipatory action, the effectiveness of an expected strike by a labor organization. Reynolds dissented,
arguing that the complaint should be dismissed and that:
"Such an economic lockout, not unlawfully motivated, is not rendered illegal simply because it had the
effect of neutralizing the economic pressure exerted by
a union to resolve in its favor an impasse arising out
of good faith bargaining negotiations."
Reynolds found in the union action in striking only one
of the 35 members of the multi-employer association a "divide
and conquer" strategy designed to force the employers to abandon their association-wide bargaining. He thought that the:
"Employers' decision that all or none should continue operations was a proper exercise of defensive
economic power under the present statutory scheme of
collective bargaining."
The Board said that the minority view would amount to
the sanctioning of the vicarious or constructive strike, thus
giving an "incongruous construction" to the act. Under this
view if the union struck less than all of the employers, the
union members would be deprived of the protection of the
act; if it struck all employers, the union would be protecteda result not in accordance with the idea of minimizing industrial strife.
We have quoted from the above case merely for the information of the court, and not because we rely on the decision
therein.
Several cases involving the definition of the term "estab24
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lishment" and the existence of a strike or labor dispute at the
establishment arose as a result of a strike at the Rouge Plant
of the Ford :Motor Company. In the case of Donald L. Nordling, et al, Respondents, vs. Ford Motor Company, Relator,
Minnesota Supreme Court, April 28, 1950, 42 N. W. 2d 576,
the court said in speaking of the term "establishment":
"\XT e believe that the question involved in this case
is very narrow. A determination of what is meant in
out statute by the term 'establishment' will be decisive
of the issues now before us, regardless of whether the
employees will share in the benefits of the strike if
the union wins or not, and regardless of whether the
same international union represents all ·Ford employees.

"It is true ~hat our act contemplates compensation
for those who are unemployed because of no fault of
their own. However, where there is an express provision for disqualification, the facts must come within
the meaning of the words used by the majority if the
disqualification is to be effective. The disqualification
which we have under consideration relates to unemployment due to a labor dispute, and it is clear that
before such labor dispute can effectively disqualify,
it must be in progress at the establishment at which the
claimant is 01' was employed. The mere fact that the
employees are represented by the same agent will not
suffice to disqualify if the strike or labor dispute causing the unemployment is not in progress at the establishment at which the claimant was, or is, employed.
"Where there are disqualifying provisions, the exception should be narrowly construed. But these rules
of construction do not mean that we are at liberty to
put something into the statute which is not there. Our
function, guided by ordinary rules of construction, is
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to ascertain if we can what the legislative intent was
and to give effect to it."
The court called attention to the fact that the term establishment was not legislatively defined. The court, in discussing
the meaning of the word "establishment," distinguished the
Spielman case cited by petitioners, commenting that in that
case the two plants constituted an "establishment" within the
meaning of the Wisconsin statute "because of the physical
proximity, functional integrality and general unit of these
plants." It called attention to the fact that the facts and the
ruling in the case of Chrysler Corporation vs. Smith, 298 N.W.
87, were similar to the Spielman case.
The Minnesota court says:
"The difficulty with attempting to use as an absolute
test the facts as laid down in the Spielman case comes
in its application to the facts of a particular case. Many
enterprises have functional integrality between fac·
tories which are separately owned. Some are so integrated in part with units or factories having the same
ownership and in part with factories or plants which
are independently owned. That is the situation which
we have in the instant case. Out of some 3,800 or
4,000 parts, about 900 come from the Rouge plant.
Some come from other plants owned by the Ford Motor
Company, and still others come from plants independently owned. A shutdown caused by strike or other
labor dispute at one of such independent vendors
might conceivably cause a shutdown at the St. Paul
Ford plant. This did actually happen in 1945 when
a strike occurred at the Kelsey Hayes plant. We assume that it is not uncommon that the same international union would represent the employees of several independent plants or factories operating as the
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Ford plant does with its independent vendors, but
'''e do not believe that anyone would contend that a
strike at the plant of such independent vendor would
disqualify employees of the Ford plant if it was forced
to shut down on account of the lack of parts furnished
by such independent vendor."
The court, after pointing out that proximity of operations
is not sufficient in and of itself as a test and that general unity
is not of itself a test, states as follows:
"We believe the better rule to be that these factors,
together with other facts, must be taken into consideration in determining whether the unit under consideration is in fact a separate establishment from the standpoint of employment. The St. Paul branch of Ford
Motor Company is highly integrated with other units
of the company for purposes of efficient management
and operation, but is separate insofar as the employees
are concerned for the purpose of employment. The
employees are hired and discharged by the St. Paul
manager. They are members of a local union which has
no connection with the locals at Dearborn except that
all locals are members of the same international as are
many others not connected with the Ford Motor Company. The seniority rights of employees extend only to
operations at the St. Paul plant. No showing has been
made, nor do we believe that any can be made, that an
employee at the St. Paul plant can 'bump' an employee
at the Rouge plant.
"We believe that the solution of the problem lies
in determining from all the facts available whether the
unit under consideration is a separate establishment
from the standpoint of employment, and not whether
it is a single enterprise from the standpoint of management or for the more efficient production of goods."
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In the instant case, it does not appear that the petitioners
can establish, in even the minutest respect, that the word "establishment" as used in the Utah Act could possibly include the
operations of the members who shut down after a strike had
been called at the Barker and Paul jobs. Admittedly there
is no unity of employment relationship, and certainly there is
no unity of operation. The only unity which exists is that
established for the purposes of bargaining negotiations.
There certainly was no strike at any but the two jobs.
There is no showing in the record that any strike vote had
been taken which would have made a strike at the other operations legal. In effect, the petitioners are arguing that the
members of the Association whose operations were not struck
could include their employees in the strike merely by shutting
down operations.
The disqualification provisions of the Utah Act are restrictive in their very nature, and can be applied only in the
event that there is a strike at the establishment at which the
worker is employed. We are not concerned when applying the
provisions of the Utah Act with the fact that a labor dispute
might exist industry-wide or with the ultimate determination
as to who caused the strike. If a claimant's unemployment is
due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike at
the establishment at which he is employed, he is not entitled
to benefits. When he and his fellow employees have not taken
a concerted action to withhold their services from their particular employer, there is, of course, no strike which affects them.
In almost every case there is a labor dispute which forms
a basis for the resulting strike. It does not follow that there
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necessarily will be a strike even though a labor dispute exists.
We think that the legislature passing the Utah Employment
Security Act was well aware of the distinction and that the
legislature intended to make the disqualification provision restrictive in its application. If it had not so intended it would
have used the words "labor dispute" instead of "strike."
We respectfully submit that the unemployment of the
claimants involved in this matter was due to the fact that their
respective employers shut down operations as a result of the
labor dispute and that the unemployment was not due to a
stoppage of work which existed because of a strike within
the meaning of the Utah Act. The claimants, therefore, should
be granted unemployment compensation benefits.

Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
FRED F. DREMANN, Special
Assistant Attorney General

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

